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“THE GOLDMAN SACHS OF THE SEA”
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Once described as a “lucky” and “charmed” vessel, BP’s much celebrated
$560 million Deepwater Horizon oil rig was charged with drilling one of the world’s
deepest wells in the middle of the Gulf of Mexico.1 At approximately 1:00 AM on
the morning of April 20, 2010, BP executives in Houston, Texas, received news that
cementing on the well’s final casing was complete.2 What began as a joyous day for
the crew of the Deepwater Horizon ended in disaster, as escaping gas from the well
exploded, eventually causing the rig to vanish in a fireball visible from thirty-five
miles away.3 By 11:00 PM, 115 crewmen from the Deepwater Horizon had escaped by
lifeboat; however, eleven others went missing, and their bodies were never
recovered.4
Two days after the explosion, the 33,000-ton Deepwater Horizon sank under
nearly 5,000 feet of water, causing a five-mile oil slick to form and ultimately
triggering the “worst environmental disaster America has ever faced.”5 The first
containment efforts focused on closing the blowout preventer valves on the
* J.D., University of Tennessee College of Law.
See Mark Washburn, A Huff and Boom Ended Deepwater Horizon’s Good Luck, MCCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS (May 14, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/14/94184/a-huff-and-boomended-deepwater.html; see also Elizabeth Kolbert, Oil Shocks, THE NEW YORKER (May 31, 2010),
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2010/05/31/100531taco_talk_kolbert.
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See President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill (June 15, 2010), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/16/us-oil-spill-obama-text-idUSTRE65F02C20100616
[hereinafter Address to the Nation]; see also Timeline: Oil Spill in the Gulf, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/05/03/timeline.gulf.spill/index.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
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wellhead, but rough seas, bad weather, and intense pressures in the deep water
rendered these attempts unsuccessful.6 Several later containment efforts also failed,
including attempts to place a containment dome over the spewing well and pumping
7,000 barrels of drilling mud into the busted pipes.7 It was not until July 15—nearly
three months after the explosion—that BP stopped the leak with a new tight-sealing
containment cap.8 The relief well was completed one month later.9 By that point,
however, nearly 4.9 million barrels of crude oil had leaked into the Gulf of Mexico,
“penetrat[ing] deep into the Louisiana marshes, devastating environmentally sensitive
and important wetland areas” and reaching the shorelines of four Gulf states.10
Arguably adding to the devastation, the Obama administration imposed a
moratorium on deepwater drilling permits in new areas and expanded fishing
restrictions to cover 26% of U.S. federal waters.11
The blame game began almost immediately as people sought to hold
someone accountable for the largest and most destructive oil spill in U.S. history. In
President Obama’s first remarks to the public in the wake of the disaster, he vowed
to “make BP pay for the damage their company has caused.”12 BP, on the other
hand, blamed Transocean, the owner of the Deepwater Horizon. In an interview in
May 2010, BP Chief Executive Tony Hayward insisted that "‘[t]he drilling rig was a
See generally Methods That Have Been Tried to Stop the Leaking Oil, NYTIMES.COM (Aug. 17 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/05/25/us/20100525-topkill-diagram.html.
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BP Says Oil Stops Leaking into Gulf for First Time Since Spill Began, FOXNEWS.COM (July 15, 2010),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/07/15/bp-begins-critical-pressure-test-new-cap-oil.
8

See Harry R. Weber, Relief Well Reaches Deepwater Horizon Hole in Gulf, Final Plus Is Near,
CLEVELAND.COM (September 17, 2010, 9:25 AM),
http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2010/09/relief_well_reaches_deepwater.html.
9

Scott Summy, The Legal Challenges and Ramifications of the Gulf Oil Spill, in 2010 GULF COAST OIL
DISASTER: LITIGATION AND LIABILITY 5, 5 (Phyllis Lipka Skupien & Rita Ann Cicero eds., Thomson
West 2010).
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11 Obama Extends Moratorium on Offshore Drilling, CBSNEWS.COM (May 27, 2010, 4:05 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/27/politics/main6523412.shtml; see also Brian Wagner,
Oil Spill Threatening Fishing Economy, Culture in Louisiana, VOICE OF AMERICA (June 1, 2010),
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/usa/Oil-Spill-Threatening-Fishing-Economy-Culture-inLouisiana-95374619.html.
12

Address to the Nation, supra note 5.
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Transocean drilling rig; it was their equipment that failed, it was their systems and
processes that were running it.’"13 Halliburton, the contractor for the cement work
on the well, also garnered some blame after the failure of the cementing was cited as
a factor that contributed to the spill.14 In January 2011, the National Commission on
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling released its final report,
tracing the immediate causes of the well blowout “to a series of identifiable mistakes
made by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean that reveal such systematic failures in risk
management that they place in doubt the safety culture of the entire industry.”15
While the report stressed the necessity of significant reform in the regulatory
oversight of leasing, energy exploration, and production, the government placed
most of the blame on the oil and gas industry.16
In this article, I explain how the oil and gas industry effectively captured the
Minerals Management Service (“MMS”), the federal agency charged with regulating
offshore drilling in the outer continental shelf.17 I intend to show that, as a result of
this capture, the government should take more responsibility for its role in causing
the BP oil spill. Part II will explain the history of regulatory capture theory and
broadly define the factors that typically lead to regulatory capture. Part III will
discuss the MMS, with emphasis on the historical context in which the agency was
created and its conflicting responsibilities. Part IV will expand on the factors set
forth in Part II and use them to illustrate how the oil and gas industry gradually
captured the MMS. Part V will discuss the future of regulating the offshore oil
industry and will summarize reform measures that have already been instituted to
correct the shortcomings of the MMS. This Part will also consider whether the BP
oil spill was the result of “big government” failures, as well as highlight a study of
Christopher Helman, The BP Oil Spill Blame Game, FORBES.COM (May 4, 2010, 7:32 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/04/bp-oil-transocean-business-energy-gulf-spill.html.

13

14 John M. Broder, Panel Says Firms Knew of Cement Flaws Before Spill, NYTIMES.COM (Oct. 28, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/us/29spill.html.

NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP
WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING, RECOMMENDATIONS
vii (2011), available at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OSC_Deep_Water_Summary_Re
commendations_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS].
15
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See id.

Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda:
Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 167 (1990).
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how costs and benefits might be incorporated into an assessment of regulatory
policies affecting deepwater drilling. Finally, Part VI will discuss how the U.S.
government must accept the reality of regulatory capture in order to prevent similar
disasters in the future.
II.

THE THEORY OF REGULATORY CAPTURE

The theory of regulatory capture is based on the concept that “government
regulation reflects the influence of special interests, and is created and operated for
their advantage.”18 Capture theory first appeared in the 1950s as an alternative to the
“public interest” theories of regulation, which were criticized as being naïve about
government behavior and motives.19 The classical public interest theory, premised
on the traditional belief that governmental policy-makers are essentially “public”
individuals, assumes that political actors seek to further the interests of society as a
whole.20 This theory “is both a positive theory about what motivates policy-makers
and a normative theory about what should motivate them.”21 On the other hand,
capture theory posits that the agencies charged with protecting the public interest
actually come to identify with the regulated industry, protecting its interests over
those of the public.22 In fact, Richard Posner, an early critic of the public interest
theory of regulation, defined regulatory capture as “[t]he theory that economic
regulation is not about the public interest at all, but is a process by which interest
groups seek to promote their (private) interests.”23 Similarly, George Stigler, in
arguably the most famous essay on industry’s power over the regulatory state, argued
that “regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily
for its benefit.”24

18

Id. at 169.

19

Id. at 167-68.

20

See id. at 168-69.

21

Id. (emphasis in original).

See Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 341-42
(1974).
22

23

Id. at 341.

24

George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971).
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Central to the theory of regulatory capture is the idea that regulators can be
swayed by private interests. “Generally, an agency may be considered ‘captured’
when it has moved too far toward accommodating industry interests and away from
the policies enshrined in its guiding statutes or freestanding policy norms, such as
efficiency.”25 Several factors are often cited as encouraging the agency to make
decisions favored by regulatory interests. First, capture cannot occur without broad
discretion given to the agency by its governing statutes.26 Discretion is necessary
because it “allows agencies to cave-in to regulated interests, as they are not
constrained by enforceable legal authority.”27 Moreover, “Broad discretion also
deprives agencies of the law as a shield: the regulator cannot claim to be bound by
law to policies opposed by regulated entities.”28
A second factor leading to regulatory capture is “the array of active interest
groups.”29 Generally, the more active interest groups making claims on regulators,
the less likely the agency is to adopt policies in favor of any one group.30 The
opposite is also true, however, as the regulator is likely to favor the interests of the
regulated community if the voices of countervailing interest groups, such as
environmentalists or consumer advocates, are not heard.31 Furthermore, a third
factor is the agency’s scarcity of resources, which often forces regulators to rely on
the regulated industry itself for assistance.32 As a result of information asymmetries
and a lack of resources necessary to access this information, regulators must call on
the more knowledgeable interest groups in the course of carrying out their regulatory

Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 107 (2002).
25

26

Id. at 109.

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id.

See id.; see also Paul Sabatier, Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies: Toward a More Adequate—and Less
Pessimistic—Theory of “Clientele Capture”, 6 POL’Y SCI. 301, 318 (1975) (arguing that “the presence of an
organized constituency (supportive of aggressive regulation) capable of monitoring the agency and of
mobilizing in its defense is a necessary and, within certain broad limits, even a sufficient condition for
forestalling [regulatory capture]”).
30

31

Zinn, supra note 25, at 109.

32

Id.
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functions.33 Not only could this cooperation illegitimate the agency’s authority, but it
could also result in the regulator being more concerned about the views of the
regulated industry, thus opening the door to capture.34
A fourth factor making a regulatory agency susceptible to capture is the
regulated industry’s influence on elected officials. Oftentimes, “an executive or
legislator may be a more effective conduit for influencing an agency than is direct
lobbying of the agency.”35 For example, if an executive figure shares the interests of
the regulated industry, the executive may be able to further that industry’s agenda
and undercut the regulatory agency’s effectiveness by utilizing policy tools such as
appointments, budget requests, and executive orders.36
Finally, a regulated industry may gain influence over regulatory agencies
through the movement of personnel between the roles of regulator and regulatee—
often referred to as the “revolving door” hypothesis.37 Popularized by Ralph Nader
in the 1970s, “the idea [is] that regulatory agencies become captives of industry
because former business executives take influential positions in government agencies
whose job it is to regulate business, but perhaps more fundamentally because
regulators are seduced by prospects of moving to more lucrative employment in the
industries they were regulating.”38 The first half of the theory, the “revolving doorin,” suggests that regulators coming from industry may be induced “to make proindustry decisions because of . . . having been ‘socialized’ in an industry

See id. at 109-10 (citing the example of a regulator charged with the adoption of workplace safety
regulations who must rely on industry for an adequate “understanding of the production processes
involved, epidemiological or accident data, and knowledge of the costs, mechanics, and effectiveness
of competing preventative measures”).
33

34

See id. at 110.

35

Id.

Id.; see also MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 26667 (1955) (“The extent to which regulation becomes the handmaiden of private interests depends in
large measure on the existing balance among interest groups and the success of these groups in
joining forces with . . . powerful political leaders.”).
36

37

See Zinn, supra note 25, at 110-11.

Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense of Regulatory Capture, 12
J. PUB. POL’Y 61, 62 (1992).

38
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environment.”39 Similarly, the “revolving door-out” suggests that “regulators may
bias their decisions in order to enhance their chance of future employment in
industry.”40 In the latter scenario, regulators may attempt to signal their interest in
industry employment by being lenient when discharging their regulatory duties.41
III.

THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE

Shortly after the Deepwater Horizon exploded, many commentators began
placing blame on regulators and describing the oil spill as the “most recent in a string
of disasters caused by the failure of regulatory authorities.”42 At the heart of the
crisis, they argued, was the theory of regulatory capture. They claimed that the
MMS, the federal agency charged with regulating offshore drilling activity and
protecting the public from its potential undesirable consequences, was essentially
“operat[ing] as a rubber stamp for BP.”43 Throughout the remainder of this article, I
will use the factors described above to support the argument that the MMS was
effectively captured by the offshore drilling industry.
The Reagan administration created the MMS in 1982 “[a]gainst a backdrop of
rising inflation, record interest rates, further turbulence in the oil market following
the 1979 Iranian revolution, and a severe recession.”44 Contrary to his predecessors’

39 Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 203, 214 (2006). For a
unique study on whether the revolving door theory leads to capture in Australia’s nursing home
industry, see Makkai & Braithwaite, supra note 38, at 63-77, concluding that hopes of going out the
revolving door, while not indicative of regulator toughness, did lead to identification with the industry
and sympathy with the nursing home’s problems.
40

Dal Bó, supra note 39, at 214.

41

Id.

Lara Marlowe, Oil Spill is Just Latest US Disaster Caused by Regulatory Failures, IRISHTIMES.COM (May 5,
2010), http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2010/0529/1224271392641.html, reprinted in
SHELL TO SEA, http://www.shelltosea.com/content/oil-spill-just-latest-us-disaster-caused-regulatoryfailures (last visited Apr. 25, 2012); see also Gerald P. O’Driscoll, The Gulf Spill, the Financial Crisis and
Government Failure, WSJ.COM (June 12, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704575304575296873167457684.html.
42

43

O’Driscoll, supra note 42.

NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP
WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 65 (2011), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/
44
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beliefs, President Reagan made it clear that government regulation was a primary
cause of many of the nation’s problems and was stifling the development of its rich
natural resources.45 As a result, Secretary of the Interior James Watt46 focused his
initial reform efforts on offshore drilling and “quickly vowed to lease a billion acres
of the outer continental shelf—virtually the entire area—for oil and gas
exploration.”47 The MMS was the vehicle by which the federal government would
realize “the financial fruits of its plan for this massive expansion in offshore
drilling.”48 The plan was a success, too. In fact, just one year after the birth of the
MMS, the federal government brought in just over $10 billion in leasing revenue
from the outer continental shelf—nearly $4 billion more than in the previous year.49
From its inception, it was evident that the focus of the MMS would be on
generating revenue for the federal government.50 The problem was that revenue
collection was not the only responsibility of the MMS. It was also charged with
offshore leasing, permitting and operational safety, and environmental protection.51
The devastating result of these conflicting responsibilities was that “the same agency
became responsible for regulatory oversight of offshore drilling—and for collecting
revenue from that drilling.”52 Because safety and environmental concerns were
subordinate to revenue collection, the MMS was ill-equipped to “adequately address
the risks generated by the offshore industry’s new technologies and exploration,
documents/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf
PRESIDENT].
45

[hereinafter

REPORT

TO

THE

Id. at 63.

James Watt’s disdain for environmentalists was well known across political circles. A few days after
the BP oil disaster, Ian Masters, the host of a public radio show in Los Angeles, suggested that
“putting Watt’s agency in charge of protecting the environment from oil spills might be ‘like putting
Count Dracula in charge of the blood bank.’” WILLIAM R. F REUDENBURG & ROBERT GRAMLING,
BLOWOUT IN THE GULF: THE BP OIL SPILL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF ENERGY IN AMERICA
54-55 (2010).
46

47

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 44, at 63.

48

Id.

49

See id. at 64 fig.3.2.

50

See id. at 63.

51

See id. at 67.

52

Id. at 65.

2012]

BP’S DEEPWATER HORIZON: “THE GOLDMAN SACHS OF THE SEA”

323

development, and production activities, including industrial expansion into deeper
waters.”53
IV.

REGULATORY CAPTURE OF THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE
A. Broad Discretion Given to the MMS by its Governing Statutes

As mentioned above, the first factor making an agency susceptible to
regulatory capture is broad discretion given to the agency by its governing statutes.54
Discretion allows regulators to succumb to industry pressures without the threat of
any enforceable legal authority.55 In regards to offshore drilling, there are many
federal laws designed to protect the environment; however, these laws are littered
with exceptions, loopholes, and other provisions that ultimately undermine the
essence of the safeguards. The 1978 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments (“1978 Act”), which led to the creation of the MMS, is the most
obvious example of offshore legislation that failed to live up to its promise of full
consideration of environmental protection concerns.56 The 1978 Act
requires that the timing and location of exploration, development,
and production of oil and gas take environmental factors into
consideration, including: existing ecological characteristics; an
equitable sharing of development benefits and environmental risks
among the regions; the relative environmental sensitivity and marine
productivity of areas; and relevant environmental and predictive
information.57
While the 1978 Act requires consideration of these environmental concerns, it also
affords the Secretary of the Interior great discretion in deciding what weight to
assign to them.58 As the National Commission on the BP Oil Spill noted in its final

53

Id. at 68.

54

See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.

55

Zinn, supra note 25, at 109.

56

See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 44, at 64, 79.

57

Id. at 79 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2) (2006)).

58

Id. at 80 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006)).
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report to the President, “The balance ultimately struck depends largely on the politics
of the moment.”59
Furthermore, some provisions in the 1978 Act actually make it more difficult to
give full consideration to environmental concerns. For instance, the Secretary of the
Interior “must approve a lessee’s exploration plan within thirty days of [its]
submission.”60 Such a timetable, however, makes it unfeasible to review these plans
with the level of scrutiny required to take into account many of the aforementioned
environmental concerns.61 Additionally, the 1978 Act exempts lessees in the Gulf of
Mexico from more rigorous environmental oversight, including having to submit to
the Secretary a development and production plan that sets forth “‘the environmental
safeguards to be implemented.’”62 By exempting the lessees from the development
and production plans, the 1978 Act also exempted them from the related, but more
comprehensive, environmental impact statement required under the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).63 These exemptions were the result of a
political compromise between the Carter administration, Congress, the Gulf states,
and the oil and gas industry, who were concerned that NEPA and the development
and production plans would unnecessarily lengthen the interval between leasing and
production from three to six years.64 This political jockeying is another example of
how Congress and the regulatory bodies succumbed to industry pressures even when
fashioning environmental safeguards.
59

Id.

60

Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1) (2006)).

61

Id.

62

Id. at 62 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1351 (2006)).

Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1351(e)(1) (2006)). NEPA’s environmental impact statements were required
of “all major federal actions significantly affecting the human environment” and were to “include not
only discussion of the immediate adverse impacts on the natural environment that might result from
the federal action, but also the ‘socio-economic’ effects of those impacts.” Id. at 79-80 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 4332 (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2011)). While exploration plans in the central and western
Gulf of Mexico were “‘categorically excluded’” from NEPA review, the MMS conceded that such
review would be necessary in “‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Id. at 81-82. However, MMS staff
“reported that leasing coordinators and managers discouraged them from reaching conclusions about
potential environmental impacts that would increase the burden on lessees.” Id. at 82. There were
even reports that “some MMS managers reportedly ‘changed or minimized the [MMS] scientists’
potential environmental impact findings in [NEPA] documents to expedite plan approvals.’” Id.
63

64

Id. at 62.
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In addition to the 1978 Act and NEPA, several other equally promising laws
were significantly eroded by the MMS and industry representatives. The Endangered
Species Act, for example, limits (or bans altogether) offshore oil and gas activity that
has an adverse impact on endangered or threatened species.65 Likewise, the Clean
Water Act requires additional permits for any activity that results in the discharge of
pollutants into navigable waters.66 Both the Endangered Species and Clean Water
Acts, however, “ha[ve] only a narrow, discrete focus and statutory trigger” that
enables the oil and gas industry to shirk compliance.67 Also, rather than imposing
any substantive limitations on offshore drilling, both the Magnuson-Stevens Act and
the Marine Sanctuaries law “authorize[] the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) to make recommendations to MMS about possible adverse
environmental impacts (to fish habitat and marine sanctuaries) and appropriate
conservation measures.”68 The problem with these acts is that the MMS is not legally
obligated to heed the NOAA’s advice, and, in fact, NOAA officials have reported
that the MMS gives essentially no weight to their opinions.69 In sum, while most of
these laws create the potential for comprehensive environmental protection,
“[w]hether they have achieved their statutory objectives has . . . historically depended
. . . entirely on the discretionary determinations of MMS officials.”70 This broad discretion
afforded to the agency by its governing statutes allowed the MMS to surrender to
private interests.
B. Influence on Elected Officials
The ineffectiveness of the environmental protection statutes could be the
result of the oil and gas industry’s influence on elected officials. The more the
interests of elected officials and industry are aligned, the more likely it is that the
regulating agency will be forced into a captive situation.71 In the context of the BP
oil spill, the Washington Post released a report less than a month after the explosion,
65

Id. at 80-81.

Id. See generally Additional Permit Resources, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/vessels/permitresources.cfm (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
66

67

See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 44, at 81.

68

Id. at 81.

69

Id.

70

Id. (emphasis added).

71

See Zinn, supra note 25, at 110.
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stating that “[n]early 30 members of the congressional committees overseeing oil and
gas companies held personal assets in the industry totaling $9 million to $14.5 million
late last year.”72 The investments included at least $400,000 in the three companies
directly involved in the Deepwater Horizon disaster—the same companies that have
been under the microscope from these lawmakers since the explosion.73 Given the
financial interests at stake, one may question how relentless these legislators will be
in holding the industry accountable for the worst environmental disaster in U.S.
history. Additionally, it begs the question of whether the lawmakers and their
conflicting interests are truly to blame.
Examples of industry influence on elected officials extend beyond the
officials’ investment portfolios. For instance, several legislative officials have been
guilty of actively promoting the private interests of oil and gas companies, as well as
soliciting campaign contributions from these sources.74 One noted Congressman
with pro-industry sentiments is Rep. Joe Barton (R-Texas), the senior Republican on
the House Energy and Commerce Committee.75 “When BP’s CEO, Tony Hayward,
appeared before that Committee, Barton said that what he considered a ‘tragedy’ was
not so much the spill itself, but the fact that a [sic] ‘a private corporation can be
subjected to what I would characterize as a shakedown’ by the Obama
administration.”76 For over twenty-five years, Barton has faced little competition for
his Congressional seat, which is largely due to the $1.5 million donated to his
campaign from the oil and gas industry, $150,000 of which came from Andarko
Petroluem, BP’s partner in drilling the ill-fated Macondo well.77

Paul Kane & Karen Yourish, Congress Members Overseeing Firms Involved in Gulf Spill Held Oil, Gas Stock,
THE
WASH.
POST
(June
17,
2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/06/16/AR2010061605369.html. Interestingly, the report cited Sen. John
F. Kerry (D-Mass) as among Congressional members owning the most oil and gas industry stocks. Id.
“Kerry—the Senate Democrats’ lead negotiator on energy legislation—had at least $6 million in assets
from a dozen big oil and gas companies, including BP, Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobil and
ConocoPhillips.” Id.
72

73

Id.

74

See, e.g., FREUDENBURG & GRAMLING, supra note 46, at 58.

75

See id.

76

Id.

77

Id.
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The legislative branch is not the only branch of government that has been
influenced by the oil and gas industry. To illustrate this point, consider the
following:
From 2001 to early 2009, . . . MMS reported to an administration that
was headed by two Texas oil men, George W. Bush and Richard
Cheney, both of whom were famously hostile toward federal
regulations, preferring to trust the Magic of the Marketplace and
pushing for an ‘Energy Plan’ that relied heavily on secret input from
some of the nation’s biggest oil companies.78
Furthermore, despite President Obama’s vow to prevent more damage to the Gulf
region in the aftermath of the BP oil spill, the MMS continued granting “categorical
exclusions” at a rate of one per day, which exempted oil companies from providing
detailed environmental impact studies before commencing exploratory drilling.79
Even more alarming were reports stating that Martin Feldman, the district judge who
overturned the initial proposal for a six-month ban on deepwater drilling, held stock
in Transocean, Halliburton, and several other companies that would have been
affected by the ban.80 Suggesting that this problem was not limited to Feldman, the
Associated Press reported that “[m]ore than half of the federal judges in districts where
the bulk of Gulf oil spill-related lawsuits are pending have financial connections to
the oil and gas industry.”81
The regulated community’s influence on elected (and even non-elected)
government officials through monetary and other incentives often increases the
likelihood of regulatory capture, and, unfortunately for those whose lives were
adversely affected by the BP oil spill, the MMS was not immune from the trend.82
The fact that “three out of every four of the [oil and gas] industry’s Washington
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lobbyists ha[ve] previously worked in one capacity or another for the federal
government” only makes matters worse for the broader public who put their faith in
regulatory bodies.83 As noted by one commentator, “The result is a system in which
people move back and forth among the available positions, and the distinctions
between regulators and the regulated sometimes get so blurred that they disappear.”84
C. Active Interest Groups
A third factor that made the MMS susceptible to regulatory capture was the
absence of any countervailing interest groups in the Gulf region to challenge the
interests of the oil and gas companies. As noted above, “If an agency need not
accommodate competing interest groups, it is more likely to adopt the views of the
single, loud voice it hears.”85 The New York Times reported on the unique
circumstances along the Louisiana gulf coast, explaining:
Seldom do regulators work in a place so dependent on the industry
they oversee. From the top of Louisiana’s tallest building (One Shell
Square) to the bottom of its largest aquarium (with a sunken rig), oil
saturated the state’s culture long before it covered its marshes. It is
prized as a source of jobs and as a source of tax revenue.86
This special bond that Louisiana and its people have for the petroleum industry—
referred to by Chris Oynes, a former top official with the MMS, as the “‘900-pound
gorilla’”—has largely destroyed any significant political opposition.87 In fact, Oynes
stated that the MMS “‘would issue standard notices to environmental groups, and
they would never even come to a meeting . . . . Arguing against oil and gas [was not]
going to get them anywhere.’”88
Several characteristics make Louisiana different than other coastal regions
across the country where environmentalists and consumer protection groups have
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had success in making their case against offshore drilling.89 First, the offshore oil
industry in the United States was born in Louisiana, well before the emergence of
today’s environmental concerns.90 Second, Louisiana is physically different than
most other coastal regions.91 Because the state is home to the most extensive system
of coastal marshes in the United States, coastal living is practically non-existent, and
it is almost impossible to get within ten miles of the coast by road.92 Furthermore,
serving as “artificial reefs,” oil rigs provide a significant advantage for commercial
fishing operations in the area, attracting fish populations that would otherwise not
survive in a habitat where silt naturally covers the sea floor.93 Third, coastal
Louisiana is socially distinctive from other coastal regions.94 The area has historically
had some of the lowest educational levels in the country, and studies show that
“better-educated individuals in the United States generally express higher levels of
environmental concern.”95 Finally, nearly everyone living in coastal Louisiana has
either worked for the oil industry or has friends, relatives, or other acquaintances
who have worked in the industry.96 Given these facts, it is no surprise that while
others across the country were “demand[ing] the heads of BP executives on pikes,”97
Louisiana residents were shaping their own arguments against the Obama
administration’s six-month ban on deep water drilling.98 Clearly, in this environment,
the only voice the MMS was hearing was that of the oil and gas industry.

For a summary of a sociological analysis of the factors that underlie the differing reactions to
proposals for offshore oil exploration and development in northern California and southern
Louisiana, see generally William R. Freudenburg & Robert Gramling, Socioenvironmental Factors and
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D. Scarcity of Resources
A fourth, and arguably the most important, factor that encouraged the MMS
to make decisions favored by the oil and gas industry was the scarcity of agency
resources. Particularly, the depleted budget within the MMS forced regulators to
turn to the regulated community itself for assistance, opening the door for regulatory
capture.99 The primary problem was that “[d]uring the 1990s, the resources available
to the MMS decreased precipitously just as it faced a dramatic increase in the
offshore activity it was charged with overseeing—and matters only deteriorated
thereafter.”100 Between 1990 to 2009, oil production in the Gulf of Mexico more
than doubled, with 80% of the 2009 total coming from deepwater wells (up from just
4.4% in 1990).101 “As MMS’s resources lagged behind the industry’s expansion into
deepwater drilling—with its larger-scale and more demanding technology, greater
pressures, and increasing distance from shore-based infrastructure and
environmental and safety resources—the agency’s ability to do its job was seriously
compromised.”102 The industry held the informational resources needed to adopt
new safety regulations pertaining to the evolving drilling technology.103 As a result,
the MMS was forced to accept their contention that the technology was reliable and
warranted less frequent testing.104 This assumption proved costly for BP, the MMS,
and the millions of people across the Gulf coast when, on April 25, 2010, BP’s
blowout preventer failed, ultimately releasing 4.9 million barrels of oil into the Gulf
of Mexico.105
Furthermore, oil and gas companies exploited the MMS’s depleted resources
and undermined its oversight authority through a process known as “permit
shopping.”106 As offshore activity expanded further into the Gulf of Mexico, the
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number of applications for drilling permits in the New Orleans office rapidly
increased.107 Because the office lacked a sufficient number of engineers to process
permit reviews with necessary scrutiny, operators would “shop around” in other
district offices to find an engineer who would grant approval.108
With that said, depleted resources proved to be most costly in diminishing
the effectiveness of the MMS’s inspections. While the population of deepwater rigs
in the Gulf was expanding, the total number of inspections decreased from nearly
7,500 in 1994 to less than 5,000 in 2009.109 Not surprisingly, the frequency of
unannounced inspections also plummeted during this time period, as less than 3% of
inspections conducted by the MMS in 2009 were unannounced.110 Moreover, even if
an unannounced inspection was performed, the United States Coast Guard required
that 24-hour notification be given on some facilities, while a 20-minute followed by a
5-minute notification was required on all other facilities.111 Part of the problem was
that the MMS was significantly understaffed.112 At the time of the Deepwater Horizon
explosion, there was a ratio of one inspector for every fifty-four facilities in the
Gulf.113 As a result, nearly half of the inspections were conducted by a single
inspector, which increased the likelihood of operators successfully pressuring the
inspector to not issue an Incident of Noncompliance (“INC”).114
The scarcity of agency resources also affected the training and professional
development of inspectors, often leading to improper industry influence on agency
representatives. The MMS did not have a formal training, testing, or certification
program for its inspectors, opting instead for on-the-job training provided by more
SALAZAR 6 (2010), available at http://www.noia.org/website/navdispatch.asp?id=40069 [hereinafter
REPORT TO SALAZAR].
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 44, at 74. From 2005 to 2009, the number of applications
in the district office grew from 1,246 to 2,136—an increase of 71%. Id.
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experienced inspectors.115 As a result, “the agency . . . look[ed] for new inspectors
who already ha[d] experience, usually through prior work in the oil and gas
industry.”116 Ironically, this preference actually encouraged the “revolving door
hypothesis” (detailed in the following section) by bringing inspectors into the MMS
that likely already possessed pro-industry sentiments.117 Even then, the training
programs were not enough to keep pace with the rapidly changing deepwater
technology; thus, many inspectors were forced to rely on industry representatives to
explain the technology at a facility.118
While much of the ineffectiveness of the inspection process can be attributed
to a depleted budget, some of it was caused by the unique circumstances in the Gulf
described in the previous section.119 Inspections become particularly difficult when
the inspectors have either worked in the oil and gas industry or have friends or
family members that work in the industry.120 “For example, one inspector reported
arriving at a facility to find that his brother, who worked for the operator elsewhere,
had been flown to the facility to act as the compliance officer.”121 Additionally, many
inspectors reported that “personnel on a facility [would] make comments such as
‘there goes my bonus,’ or ‘my wife is sick and I’ll lose my job’” in order to pressure
inspectors not to issue an INC.122 In the event that an operator did receive an INC,
they would often complain about the inspector’s behavior to MMS managers.123 At
times, this would result in the INC being rescinded.124 As a result of this practice, “A
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number of inspectors felt they were not sufficiently supported by their management
and that in some cases management would give the benefit of the doubt to
industry.”125 This lack of managerial support is a prime example of a regulatory
agency moving too far toward accommodating industry interests and represents yet
another factor that made the MMS susceptible to regulatory capture.126
E. In and Out the Revolving Door
Many have pointed to the revolving door hypothesis as one of the primary
factors leading to regulatory capture of the MMS.127 The theory suggests that MMS
officials would tend to favor the oil and gas industry if they had a background in the
industry or if they expected rewards in the form of future employment with the
industry.128 Multiple sources and studies indicate that this was exactly what was
happening at the MMS in the years preceding the BP oil spill.129 For example, a
report by the New York Times mentioned several high-profile government officials
who had bolted for industry jobs:
Gale Norton, secretary of Interior under President Bush, became
Shell’s general counsel, and J. Steven Griles, a deputy secretary of
Interior, lobbied for numerous oil and gas industries—including
BP—before he went to jail for obstructing a Senate investigation.
Randall Luthi, the most recent director of M.M.S., is now president
of the National Oceans Industries Association, whose mission is to
secure a “favorable regulatory and economic environment for the
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companies that develop the nation’s valuable offshore energy
resources.”130
The problem does not appear to be limited to the higher ranks of
government employment, however, as ethical issues have surfaced among the
inspecting ranks of the MMS as well. An Inspector General’s investigation in 2010
revealed that “one employee had conducted inspections on a company’s oil
platforms while in the process of negotiating (and later accepting employment) with
the company.”131 Moreover, lending credence to the revolving door-in theory of
regulatory capture, Michael Bromwich, the first director of the newly revamped
MMS, suggested in a statement to the Washington Post that some regulators actually
conducted inspections of their former employers.132 Depending on their prior
relationship, one could imagine these inspectors being lenient on their former
bosses.
As might be expected, much of the reason the MMS and other regulatory
officials go out the revolving door and into industry jobs involves the prospects of
better compensation. In 1981, Don Kash, the Chief of the Conservation Division
for the U.S. Geological Survey, expressed concern that “the government could not
retain ‘geologists and geophysicists associated with [outer continental shelf] activities’
because they ‘can move to an industrial or business concern for a substantial increase
in pay, almost at will.’”133 Even today, the engineers’ salaries are still “far too low to
attract individuals possessing the experience and expertise needed to oversee the
increasingly complicated oil and gas drilling activities in the deepwater Gulf.”134
Assuming the government can eliminate these pay differences, further reaching
reforms will still be necessary to defeat the revolving door problem troubling
regulation of the oil and gas industry. As noted by Mandy Smithberger, an
investigator with the Washington-based Project on Government Oversight, “‘The
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revolving door has spun so readily in this case that the lines between the regulators
and the regulated are now virtually nonexistent.’”135
F. Degeneration of Ethical Culture
A final factor that made the MMS susceptible to industry influence,
ultimately making it a victim of regulatory capture, was the gradual degeneration of
the ethical culture surrounding the agency. The agency’s preoccupation with
generating revenues not only diverted its attention from drilling safety, but it also led
to “serious charges of abuse of government authority and even charges of criminal
misconduct by a few individuals.”136 Many of these claims stemmed from a March
31, 2010 report by the U.S. Department of the Interior, which addressed a number
of allegations that MMS employees in the Lake Charles District office had accepted
gifts from oil and gas companies.137 These employees “went hunting and fishing on
the companies’ tab, accepted company meals, went skeet shooting at the companies’
expense, and in one case flew on a private plane to watch Louisiana State University
in the Peach Bowl.”138 When asked about these allegations, the District Manager for
the Lake Charles office responded:
“Obviously, we’re all oil industry . . . . We’re all from the same part
of the country. Almost all of our inspectors have worked for oil
companies out on these same platforms. They grew up in the same
towns. Some of these people, they’ve been friends with all their life.
They’ve been with these people since they were kids. They’ve hunted
together. They fish together. They skeet shoot together . . . . They
do this all the time.”139
135
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While this unique industry/government dynamic in the Gulf region might explain
part of the problem, it does not help explain some of the more alarming allegations.
For example, during the course of the investigation, a few employees admitted to
using drugs, including methamphetamine and cocaine, while offshore on company
platforms.140 The investigation also “discovered 314 instances where . . . employees
received or forwarded pornographic images and links to Internet websites containing
pornographic videos to other federal employees and individuals outside of the office
using their government e-mail accounts.”141
Furthermore, a 2008 Inspector General’s report uncovered more unethical
and criminal conduct associated with the “‘royalty in kind’” program, based in the
MMS’s Denver office.142 This program allowed the MMS to accept royalty payments
“‘in kind’” rather than in cash.143 Similar to the report from the Lake Charles office,
this investigation “discovered what the report called ‘a culture of substance abuse
and promiscuity’ in which employees accepted gratuities ‘with prodigious
frequency.’”144 The report found that officials had “accepted gifts, engaged in drug
use, and . . . even had sex with employees of the energy firms from which they were
expected to collect royalties.”145
Not only did these unfortunate acts of unethical conduct give the industry
the upper hand in its dealings with the MMS, but they also gave the oil and gas
companies the ability to better promote and market their businesses.146 For example,
the MMS issued “‘safe awards’” to those companies with the lowest number of
violations and civil penalties in each district.147 “[I]n 2009, the MMS gave its regional
Safety Award for Excellence (SAFE) . . . to Transocean—the company that owned
the Deepwater Horizon, and that Lloyd’s Register had found to have ‘critical equipment
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items that may lead to loss of life, serious injury or environmental damage.’”148
Ironically, BP was a contender for two safety awards at the 2010 Awards luncheon,
which was scheduled to take place less than two weeks after the explosion of the
Deepwater Horizon.149 While the exact effect that the degeneration of the ethical
culture at the MMS had on the BP oil spill is uncertain, it is clear that it was yet
another factor that encouraged the agency to make decisions favored by regulated
interests.
V.

REGULATING THE OFFSHORE OIL INDUSTRY IN THE FUTURE

Like the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Food and Drug
Administration, and the Securities and Exchange Commission before it,150 the MMS
is a striking example of regulatory capture in the United States. As discussed
throughout this article, several factors made the MMS susceptible to influence by the
oil and gas industry and opened the door for capture, including broad discretion
given to the agency by its governing statutes, influence on elected officials, absence
of active interest groups, scarcity of resources, the revolving door hypothesis, and
the degeneration of the ethical culture within the agency.151 We are now two years
removed from the most devastating environmental disaster on record in the United
States, and while BP, Halliburton, and Transocean have taken much of the blame
(and rightfully so), more attention should be shifted to the government for allowing
the industry to be captured in the first place. In its recommendations to President
Obama on the causes of the oil spill, the National Commission on the BP Oil Spill
recognized that “[f]undamental reform will be needed in both the structure of those
in charge of regulatory oversight and their internal decisionmaking [sic] process to
ensure their political autonomy, technical expertise, and their full consideration of
environmental protection concerns.”152 Some reform of the agency began just prior
to the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon, when the Department of the Interior
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terminated the “Royalty in Kind” program and instituted measures to improve the
MMS’s ethics program.153
Furthermore, on May 19, 2010, Interior Secretary Salazar signed an order
reassigning the responsibilities of the MMS to a new Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Regulation and Enforcement (“BOEMRE”).154 Recognizing the
conflicting tasks that the former MMS was charged with overseeing, Secretary
Salazar created three new divisions within the BOEMRE to cope with the
bureaucratic inadequacies and shortcomings that had plagued regulation of the
offshore oil and gas industry in the past.155 One of the divisions is “responsible for
conventional and renewable offshore energy development, including resource
evaluation, planning and leasing.”156
Another division handles “oversight,
inspections, safety and environmental protection in all offshore energy activities[,]”
and a third, which is housed in a different Interior division, carries out “both
onshore and offshore royalty and revenue functions, including the collection and
distribution of revenue, auditing and compliance, and asset management.”157
Secretary Salazar also pledged $29 million to upgrade enforcement and improve
oversight, including hiring hundreds of new inspectors to patrol the 3,500 drilling
rigs and platforms in the Gulf of Mexico.158 On June 18, 2010, the MMS was
officially abolished;159 however, one could conclude that the MMS had been
effectively abolished years before, when it succumbed to the interests of the industry
it was responsible for regulating.
153
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Many have said that the BP oil spill is just another example of the failings of
big government, particularly its regulatory regimes.160 However, the proper role of
government in our society has been fiercely debated since our country’s founding
and “marks the most profound division between Republicans and Democrats, and
perhaps the biggest difference between the US and Europe.”161 Shortly after oil
began leaking into the Gulf of Mexico, some right-wing commentators laughed at
the irony of liberals criticizing President Obama for not “demand[ing] the heads of
BP executives on pikes.”162 As one commentator put it:
The liberals’ fury at the President is almost as astounding as their
outrage over the discovery that oil companies and their regulators
might have grown too cozy. . . . Perhaps if liberals read more
conservative economists, they might understand that this is a
common consequence of the regulatory state that they have so
diligently constructed over the decades.163
Similarly, others believe that the cause of the BP oil spill is simple: “Making
government more powerful, makes it more corruptible. . . . [And s]ince laws, rules
and regulations affect peoples [sic] lives, they create an incentive for those most
affected to be able to influence those that are making the laws, rules and
regulations.”164
With that said, it is obvious that some regulation of the offshore oil industry
is necessary to deal with the negative externalities, which, as we have seen, includes
the possibility of 4.9 million barrels of crude oil leaking into our waters and
threatening our valuable ecosystems.165 In January 2011, a private study was released
“provid[ing] a conceptual framework for understanding how costs and benefits
160 See, e.g., Feel the Rage, supra note 97, at A16; Marlowe, supra note 42; O’Driscoll, supra note 42; The
BP Gulf Oil Spill, Regulatory Capture and Government Failure, THE SEA OF SYRAH (June 10, 2010, 1:09
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might be incorporated into an assessment of regulatory policies affecting deepwater
drilling.”166 The authors considered three potential regulatory cases in the study: “1)
a permanent ban on drilling applicable to all deepwater and ultradeepwater areas; 2) a
‘high-cost intermediate regulation’ that supposes that raising U.S. safety standards
increases the costs of exploration, development, and production by 20 percent; and
[3)] a ‘low-cost intermediate regulation,’ where production costs rise by 10
percent.”167 According to their findings, by 2035, a permanent ban would reduce
offshore oil production by 79%, while the intermediate regulations would reduce it
by 8% or 4% respectively.168 Such decreases in offshore oil production would almost
certainly cause an increase in the price of oil, decrease the negative externalities
associated with transportation and other activities, and make efforts to identify
alternative sources of energy more attractive.169 However, these new energy sources
would have their own negative externalities, which would offset some of the
potential benefits associated with reducing offshore oil production.170
The study further determined that annual costs are $65 billion for the
deepwater ban, $22 billion for the high-cost intermediate regulation, and $11 billion
for the low-cost intermediate regulation.171 Assuming these regulations prevent one
catastrophic spill every ten years, welfare benefits can range anywhere from $16.1
billion to $29.5 billion.172 Thus, the study indicates that a permanent ban on
deepwater drilling would never pass a cost-benefit test and is therefore not the best
solution for efficient regulation of the offshore oil and gas industry.173 On the other
hand, heightened safety regulations that raise the price for oil production could pass
the cost-benefit test, depending on the estimate of welfare benefits.174
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, having just experienced “the most wrenching financial disaster
in decades,”175 in which many accused the SEC of turning its back on the public in
the interests of Wall Street banks and hedge funds, the BP oil spill is now “being
called the ‘Goldman Sachs of the Sea.’”176 In order to prevent similar disasters in the
future, it is necessary for the government to recognize that regulatory capture
seriously undermines the effectiveness of regulatory bodies like the MMS.177 While
the Obama administration’s lawsuit against BP and other operators for their role in
causing the BP oil spill could help recover billions of dollars in cleanup costs and
damages, it will not address the concerns of the millions of Americans across the
country who put their faith in regulatory bodies to protect them from overreaching
by private industry. Regardless of what the government does, the MMS will remain a
striking example of regulatory capture.
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